A plaintiff’s lawyer doesn’t have a reliable legal claim – and money well spent on a medical expert, until the technical issues in a personal injury case are identified and investigated, and the cause of the accident established.  Only then can the responsible parties be reliably identified by the lawyer.

I know this because I have been retained as an expert to investigate the cause of accidents like slip and fall, motor vehicle, toxic fume emission and ladder falls.  There are different elements in cases like these.  Legal and medical elements are two.  The technical element is another – an important one that comes first in a personal injury case if it’s to start off on the right foot.

There are also several different involved parties depending on the technical cause of the accident – at least four in a slip and fall accident. (Refs 1, 2)  And a similar number in a ladder accident.

I was reminded of this when I read about the plaintiff legal practice conference entitled “The Doctor Is In: Medical Elements of Injury Cases”.  It’s planned for this June in St. John’s by the Atlantic Provinces Trial Lawyers Association (APTLA).

The two day conference looks extremely good for practicing lawyers with at least a dozen featured topics and national and international speakers from the medical and legal professions. The topics are medical or closely related as would be expected.  The topics on the law of expert evidence and preparing to discover an expert are also timely, particularly to those of us retained as experts.

An important two-part topic is on causation:

1. A pathologist’s view of medical causation in bodily injury
2. Legal causation, the law and variance from medical causation

This topic really needs to be treated in three parts for an even more complete and comprehensive conference:

1. A pathologist’s view of medical causation in bodily injury
2. Legal causation, the law and variance from medical causation
3. A forensic engineer’s view of technical causation in bodily injury and how it varies from legal causation

How can a lawyer confidently and reliably process a plaintiff’s claim for damages arising from bodily injury when he or she doesn’t know the technical cause of the accident and from that the party(s) responsible?  The emphasis is on confidently and reliably because lawyers are doing it now and managing often enough.  But that’s not good enough.

Establishing causation involves a two-stage inquiry: (Ref. 3)

1. The first stage involves establishing ‘factual’ causation.  That is, determining exactly what happened and who might have been involved in the incident.  This is the forensic engineering investigation.
2. The second stage involves establishing ‘legal’ causation.  This is when a lawyer reviews the factual causation – after it’s been established, and determines if the law is involved in the incident.

Determining factual causation in cases like the following is not lawyer-work.  It’s not even in the engineering text books in some cases and for certain not in the medical and legal text books.  A forensic engineer often has to “figure it out” as he goes along.

And often enough there is more than one party involved in what happened.  These parties are not known until the engineering investigation is complete.  I’ve seen the wrong party named in cases that were filed months, sometimes years before I was retained to investigate an incident.

Some examples of personal injury cases:

• I used a piece of pork belly – a pig’s belly skin, to investigate one slip and fall accident,
• also showered and walked across an accident site dripping water from my bathing suit to learn where water on a floor came from,
• investigated soap detergent on a stair landing at a retail outlet,
• carried out full scale field tests in a fatal motor vehicle accident,
• planned full scale tests using a Hollywood-style stunt man in a fatal step ladder accident,
• researched how a building “breaths” in one toxic fumes emission case and
• how fuel oil weathers in the ground in another, and,
• used binoculars to establish the cause of a man’s head injury from falling ice.
• a colleague investigated a trip and fall accident where the injured party was half-running backwards

Cases like these don’t get resolved until the technical issues are identified and investigated.  One of the above cases went on for 11 years then settled in 4 months after I completed my engineering investigation and established cause.  Many months to a few years is normal.  For sure, some of the delay is due to short comings and backlog in the justice system but not all.

I’ve seen similar situations in cases involving structural deficiencies and engineering failures and collapse in the built and natural environments as distinct from personal injury accidents.

Until the technical issues are identified and investigated thoroughly, technical causation established and the involved parties identified, the doctor’s view of medical causation might suffer for lack of some technical data.

And the practicing plaintiff lawyer won’t know who to sue, confidently and reliably – he could well be out on a limb.  To borrow and modify a comment in the description of the conference topics, “Don’t let (missing data on technical) causation sink your case”.

A three-part topic on causation is needed at the conference in St. John’s in June – medical, legal and technical – if the APTLA membership and their plaintiffs are to be even better served.

References

1. Sebald, Jens, Phd, System Oriented Concept for Testing and Assessment of the Slip Resistance of Safety, Protective and Occupational Footwear, Pro Business Gmbh, Berlin, 2009
2. Di Pilla Steven, Slip, Trip, and Fall Prevention, a Practical Handbook, 2nd ed., CRC Press, New York, 2010
3. Wikipedia, April 12, 2016

I recently mentioned how you can think – hypothesize, about the cause of a failure or accident based on very little evidence, then modify your thoughts as more comes in. (Ref. 1)  This is the nature and technique of forensic engineering investigation.  Some of the evidence can be as brief as a chance remark years ago, as happened to me.  Following is another example of this process.

(Counsel benefits from a process like this – ideally when the merits of the case are assessed.  But also when you think you have enough technical evidence to go forward and want to cut costs by stopping the forensic investigation)

***

There are a lot of multistory buildings in the Halifax area.  I learned that at least one is defective because the floors are sagging – the floors are “wavey” to use one person’s description.  A defect is a failure in engineering.

The floor in one of the rooms on the 10th floor slopes down 1.5% to 2.5% from the end to the middle.  It sags in the middle.  The room is 22 feet long by 12 feet wide.  That means the floor sags 2 to 3 inches.  That’s a lot for a commercial building.  It’s far more than a construction tolerance of 1/4 inch.  You can see the slope in the length of the conference tables.  I measured the floor with a tape and a digital level.

In another large, square room chairs with casters roll to the left side of the room when you’re sitting in one.  That happened to me.  The floor slopes down to the left in this room compared to the middle in the other room.  At least on the left half of the room where I was sitting.  Quick measurements in three places in the room and also in the reception area indicated slopes of 0.1% to less than 1.0%.  Staff in the office on this floor report that the floors slope in all the rooms.

I saw that the floors were not level on the 12th floor of the building.  Office staff were not conscious of this but they did say that previous tenants reported that the floors were not level.  I also saw the floor sloping down from a concrete column in an office on the 4th floor.

A staff member familiar with four floors in the lower part of the building reported that the floors were “Wavey.  Not very, very, very level.  We have to level when we do renovations”.

Building construction

The building is made of concrete – concrete foundations, columns and floors.

The foundations are supported on bedrock which is very strong.  I learned this from a friend who saw the foundations being constructed when his company worked on the building site.  He also said multistory buildings like this are erected quickly so they can be rented as soon as possible and make money.

Construction technique

The construction technique used to erect multistory concrete buildings is sensitive to construction schedule.

A concrete floor in a multistory building is constructed by placing concrete in forms that are supported on jack posts.  The jack posts are in turn supported on a previously constructed concrete floor below.  The floor below will also be supported on jack posts below it.  Jack posts are steel posts whose length can be adjusted – jacked up

You can see this construction technique in different places in Atlantic Canada – a number of jack posts at each floor level – usually three or four levels, below the floor under construction.  There are at least two buildings under construction now in Halifax using this technique, one on Jos. Howe Drive and the other on Young Street.

The technique involves removing the jack posts from the lowest floor and leap-frogging over the upper floors to support the forms for the next floor under construction above.

Construction schedule

I knew the construction manager who directed the work crews erecting the defective building years ago.  He told me one time – the chance remark, that he was on a very tight schedule to construct the building – had to get it up in a hurry.  Just like my friend said for multistory buildings, in general, but this one sounds like it was rushed even more.

Concrete strength

The jack posts are removed from the lowest level when the strength of the concrete forming the floor being supported just above is high enough.  The strength of concrete floors is specified by the design engineer according to the planned construction and use of the building.  Concrete sets up – gains in strength, over a number of days from the wet concrete when placed in forms to the rock-hard concrete later.  The quality of the concrete delivered to a building construction site is checked by testing companies to ensure it will set up to the design strength.

Analysis of the cause of the “wavey” floors

Building components

The defective, multistory building had five components when it was under construction:

• Concrete columns
• New concrete floor
• Forms temporarily supporting the new floor
• Jack posts supporting the forms
• Recently constructed floors supporting the jack posts

Limited information

The limited information for a hypothesis in this case is:

• Floor condition: – Sloping and sagging but usable
• Building construction: – Simple concrete columns and floors
• Construction technique: – Construct a new floor by placing concrete in forms supported on jack posts resting on recently constructed floors below.
• Construction schedule: – The multistory building was put up in a hurry
• Concrete strength: – Concrete gains its full strength over time
• My experience during construction of one multistory building and examination of another during construction

Possible causes

Analysis of the limited information suggests the following possible causes associated with one or the other of the building components.  The causes are listed beginning at the top surface of the new floor:

Cause #1. The floor forms were constructed level but the concrete was not placed and troweled level by the concrete finishers

I believe the concrete was placed and troweled level – or to the level of the forms, an important qualifier.  I’ve seen concrete finishers at work often enough.  They are proud of their craft.  And besides, the concrete form they must place and trowel the concrete to is right there in front of their eyes a few feet away.  It would be difficult to make a mistake.

Cause #2. The floor forms were not level because mistakes were made in measuring the position of the new floor on the concrete columns.  These marks are the starting point for leveling the forms

Similarly, it would be difficult to make a mistake measuring the position of the new floor on the concrete columns.  This is a simple measurement with a tape.  I can imagine it being checked and rechecked.  “Measure twice, cut once” like a carpenter does.

Cause #3. The floor forms were not level, either because of the leveling method or because the posts were not jacked up properly

The jack posts would be placed according to the level of the forms and adjusted up or down a little as required by the form leveling technique.

Based on what I’ve seen on construction sites, I can easily imagine a carpenter’s level with a spirit bubble being used to check the level of the forms and the need to adjust the jack posts.  Cheap and quick on a job that’s in a hurry, also inaccurate.  Inaccurate in different directions too depending on where you put the carpenter’s level. This would result in different slopes to the floor forms – and different slopes and sags to the finished concrete floor like I saw in the defective building.

What I’ve seen – the plumb of concrete columns being set with a carpenter’s level – floor after floor after floor on one 20 story building.  Very crude.  It’s not too great a leap of faith to believe that the floor forms were set “level” in the same way in the 20 story building.

Cause #4. The forms sagged when the heavy concrete was poured because the distance between the jack posts was too great

This might be possible but unlikely because jack posts would be placed at the construction joints between concrete floor forms.  The forms themselves would be more than rigid enough to support a layer of concrete a few inches thick.  The forms are likely to be reusable – certainly from floor to floor, but also from job to job.

Cause #5. The floors sagged because the jack posts were removed before the concrete set up and was strong enough

This is possible.  I can’t dismiss it.  Particularly if low strength concrete was accepted at the construction site and there were only three floors of jack posts in place.  However, I might expect sloping and sagging to be more broadly distributed across the new floor rather than quite variable like in the defective building.

The floor in the long, narrow room on the 10th floor that tweaked my interest sagged 2 to 3 inches over about 10 feet.  And the slope was in a different direction in the square room about 25 feet away from the narrow room.

I also can’t imagine low quality concrete being accepted at a construction site – truck load after truck load and floor after floor.

But this cause is possible because I just don’t have enough information on how deflection three or four floors down would affect a new floor way up above.

Cause #6. The floors sagged because an inadequate number of the lower floors were supported with jack posts beneath the upper floor that was under construction

This cause might be possible if jack posts were placed at only two levels rather than the three or four that seem to be normal.  I see four in the two buildings I drove by recently.  It seems like a risky decision for a construction manager on a very tight schedule and in a real hurry to get the building up even if he’s prepared to accept low strength concrete.  I also don’t know as mentioned above on how deflection two or three floors down would affect a new floor.

***

What do I think is the likely cause of the “wavey”, sagging floors based on the limited evidence?

I think – my initial hypothesis, that the floors slope and sag – because the forms were not leveled properly – Cause #3 – in the rush to get the building up.

***

The following is what we do in forensic engineering when we think about the cause of a failure or personal injury for Counsel and the justice system:

• Gather the evidence as limited as that might be and from whatever source,
• Analyse it – carefully study each piece of evidence, note it’s nature and significance, how each piece relates, where each piece leads and what the whole tells us,
• Identify and list possible causes, and related technical issues
• Factor in our experience,
• Think about and hypothesize cause – come down on one cause or the other,
• Go gather more evidence
• Analyse it – etc. etc.
• Check if the initial hypothesis stands up to the new evidence,
• Accept the hypothesis, modify it, or reject it completely and start over.

More evidence in the case of the defective, multistory building would be a precise elevation survey and contouring of many or all of the floors in the building.  Basically quantify the nature and extent of the problem, the defect whose cause you must determine.  But this is not likely to happen because the building although defective is functioning quite okay.  I’m sure there are others like it in Atlantic Canada.

References

1. Bridge failure in litigation due to inadequate bracing – City of Edmonton.  But, inadequate for what?  Posted March 15, 2016

(Forensic investigations are carried out by hypothesizing the cause of a failure or accident based on the evidence available at the time – as limited as this might be, and revising the hypothesis as more evidence comes in.  This successive hypothesizing and revising might be done several times during an investigation.  The following is an example of this process.

Counsel benefits from a process like this early in a case – ideally before deciding to take the case, when an expert studies the evidence, then, based on the available evidence, identifies and evaluates the technical issues and the cost to investigate these)

***

The cross bracing was inadequate.  I concluded that last March, a few days after the failure. (Ref. 1) I used the bridge failure to illustrate how a hypothesis – an idea, could be formed about the cause of an engineering failure based on very little evidence.  In this case, all I had were some on-line photographs .

But, inadequate for what?  To resist the service plus construction loads – weights and pressures on the bridge, as required by the Canadian Highway Bridge Design Code?  If there’s no bracing at all – none, these loads would cause the girders to buckle sideways in the order of 375 mm, not the approximately 1,000 mm or more seen in the photographs.

The 1,000 mm was determined from the photographs by scaling like we do on maps.  The known 3.0 metre depth of the girders at the middle section – see Sources below, is like a scale or ruler in the photograph.  This depth is about the same as the spacing between the girders, maybe a little less.  I decided the spacing was 3.5 metres.  I saw that the girders had buckled about 1/3 of the way into the 3.5 metre spacing – 1,000 mm or more.

The 1,000 mm buckling indicates a greater load was acting on the girders than perhaps was required to be resisted by the Code.  Where did the greater load come from to cause the 1,000 mm?

The only thing attached to the girder – at the top, that can be seen in the photographs is a sling at the end of a crane’s cable.  The cable is attached to a crane’s telescopic boom.  The boom would sway and flex a little in the wind that was blowing that night which would cause the sling below to tug on the girder – a point load in engineering.  Construction cameras show the girders intact at 2:00 in the morning and buckled at 2:15.

I hypothesized last March that this repetitive tugging caused the girders to buckle like they did.

The 1,000 mm magnitude of the buckling and the fact that crane booms sway in the wind supports this idea that tugging on the girders was the source of the greater load.

It would be of interest to know if the bracing that was in place – and seen bent in the photographs, was adequate to prevent buckling, except for the 1,000 mm due to the tugging.  There are simple calculations that bridge design engineers do to determine the bracing needed to prevent buckling in the order of 375 mm.

I did think about a sudden foundation soil failure causing the crawler crane to subside and the cable to tug on the girder as a result.  I dismissed this idea because the crane had been there a while lifting 40 tonne girders into place.  Foundation failure would have occurred some time before because of these heavy lifts if the foundation soils were inadequate.

The only way I would revise my hypothesis is to note that the crane operator did not contribute to the failure because he was not working.

The initial hypothesis

The bridge failed because the middle crane’s boom moved in the wind – possibly also due to the crane operator’s actions, causing the cable to periodically tug at the middle section of beam #6 and eventually cause it to bend.  This caused the middle sections of beams #5 and #4 to bend as well because they were connected to #6 by some cross-bracing.  The cross-bracing was inadequate to resist the force from the tugging indefinitely and eventually failed too.  The middle sections of beams #3, #2, and #1 did not bend and fail because they were adequately cross-braced.

Revised hypothesis

The bridge failed because the middle crane’s boom moved in the wind causing the cable to periodically tug at the middle section of beam #6 and eventually cause it to bend.  This caused the middle sections of beams #5 and #4 to bend as well because they were connected to #6 by some cross-bracing.  The cross-bracing was inadequate to resist the force from the tugging indefinitely and eventually failed too.  The middle sections of beams #3, #2, and #1 did not bend and fail because they were adequately cross-braced.

Sources

I studied various photographs on-line including construction photographs taken at the time of the failure.

I spoke with Barry Bellcourt, the Road Design and Construction Manager for the City of Edmonton, a few weeks ago, also Bryon Nicholson, Manager of Special Projects. Barry mentioned the litigation and the city’s position.

I also learned from him that the bridge consists of seven, 40-tonne girders.  Each girder consists of two 7.5 metre long end sections and a 43 metre middle section.  The end sections are 4.5 metres deep arching up to 3.0 metres at the middle section.  The sizes are approximate.

I saw and photographed the underside of the repaired bridge girders from Groat Road in early August when I was in Edmonton.

I understand it was windy the night the girders buckled and that was the reason workers were not on the job.

I spoke with four companies in Nova Scotia that operate cranes.  I learned that crawler crane booms move in the wind; flex and sway.  There is greater movement sideways because there is less strength that way.  Telescopic booms move more than lattice booms because of the greater surface area.  Booms are lowered to the ground in strong winds.  One company doesn’t operate its cranes in winds of 50 km/hr or more.

I also talked with Amjad Memon, a structural engineer with the Nova Scotia Department of Transportation, about the Canadian Highway Bridge Design Code.

References

1. Wind, construction crane and inadequate cross-bracing caused Edmonton bridge failure: An initial hypothesis.  Posted March 27, 2015
2. Why, in a recent blog, didn’t I seem to consider foundation failure as a possible cause of the Edmonton bridge failure?  Posted April 3, 2015
3. Bridge beams that fail are sometimes like balloons filled with water – squeeze them and they pop out somewhere else.  Posted May 20, 2015
4. Google: Edmonton bridge failure, Groat Road, Buckling, etc. to see photographs of the buckled girders.

I attended the regular quarterly meeting of CATAIR last Friday – this time at Dartmouth Crossing to enable some field testing, and learned a few things, both encouraging and disturbing.

1. I felt good learning that there are training and qualifying programs in Canada for traffic accident investigators.
2. Also, not surprisingly, that school buses have numerous safety features.
3. I was disturbed learning about the blind spots at the back of a school bus where the driver can`t see.  What he sees isn’t all of what might be there.

CATAIR along with ACTAR are two separate associations of traffic accident investigators.  The one is a forum for investigators to meet and share experiences and ideas.  The other is an accrediting organization for investigators. (Ref. 1)

It`s in order to take an interest in this field of practice considering the number of traffic fatalities in Atlantic Canada in a year, not a few of which result in charges under the law, civil litigation or insurance claims.

Encouraging

I suggested last week that it is important that your traffic accident expert is well trained, experienced and accredited.  That is still true.  ACTAR can perhaps be seen to be the ultimate and most demanding accrediting group.

However, I did learn at the meeting on Friday that there are qualifying programs in Canada that are demanding enough.  They vary across the country but generally require that traffic accident reconstructionists study and train and go through several levels of qualification.

A course for police officers comprises three main levels.  Two levels are done in the area in which the applicant serves and focuses on investigation of the traffic accident.  The third is completed at a Canadian Police College and covers reconstruction of the accident.  I understand that members of the public can take this course for a fee.

It’s important that an investigator reconstruct a traffic accident generally in accordance with the procedures his peers in the area would follow, and to have comparable qualifications.  That is, to measure up to the standard of care existing in his area of Canada at the time. (Refs 2, 3) That standard is certain to include the expectation that you went through a qualifying program of some sort, in view of the fact they do exist.

If charges or a dispute arises from the traffic accident the investigative procedures followed by the investigator may be evaluated by his peers at the report writing stage or the discovery and trial stages, according to the standard of care.

***

I mentioned a few days ago that the meeting on Friday would do the following things, and these got done:

1. See a demonstration of the latest school bus safety features,
2. Perform instrumented braking and acceleration tests,
3. Measure the bus’s turning radius and rear wheel off-tracking, and,
4. Examine sight lines/views obstructions.

There are school bus safety features too numerous to mention, but the bus driver did a good job briefing us on these.  Proper thing parents would say. These features include:

• Exacting bus driver training and qualification,
• Walk around safety checks,
• Knowing where the bus is at all times,
• Training students on how to exit the bus in an emergency – including through roof escape hatches,
• Front windows that pop out in an accident,
• Doors that can be opened easily both inside and out,
• Etc.

I was impressed to learn that these very large buses when empty, at a speed of 50 km/hour can be stopped within about 2/3 to 3/4 the length of a bus when the brakes are applied.  Dr. Stu Smith, C. Tyner and Associates, measured these speeds and stopping distances with a braking test computer.  Skid resistance or sliding resistance of the asphalt pavement was also measured by consultants using a drag sled, a test that is very similar to the coefficient of friction test in high school physics.

Disturbing

What disturbed me was the school bus driver’s blind spots at the back.  I sensed from the tone of the bus driver`s voice that these are worrying.  They just can`t see everything at the back of the bus from the driver`s seat regardless the number and size of the rear view mirrors.

I think it’s also going to be interesting to see the results of the rear wheel off-tracking measurements.  The rear wheels are in a different place to the front wheels when a bus is turning.  It`s in order for the bus driver to know where they`re at, a skill acquired by the time the driver gets his licence.  Not so easy dealing with the blind spots.  The wheel tracks were accurately located by RCMP Corporal Michel Lanteigne, Tracadie, NB using total stations land surveying equipment.

***

Why should you take an interest in all of this?  How about 18 traffic fatalities on Prince Edward Island Island last year, and possibly more in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland.  And all quite likely got investigated by traffic accident reconstructionists.  Some of these I’m sure resulted in charges and possibly disputes arose and civil litigation begun.

***

Ken Zwicker, the CATAIR regional director, organized a very instructive meeting and kept it “moving right along“ during the day.  Corporal Lanteigne – who travelled the farthest, a 9.5 hour round trip, was everywhere during our field work on Friday, including on Ken`s heels.  Others came from Fredericton, I think Saint John, and from Prince Edward Island.  Several of us travelled all of 20 minutes from Halifax.

References

1. Is your traffic accident investigator well trained, experienced and “accredited”?. Posted February 23, 2016
2. Garner, Bryan A., ed., Black`s Law Dictionary, 4th ed. 2011, Thomson Reuters, St. Paul, MN
3. How the standard of care is determined when a failure or accident occurs in the built environment.  Posted June 28, 2014

There are a couple of associations that can ensure this.  I was impressed by the “science-based” nature of one.  And its support of another that has a well developed and internationally accepted accreditation program for investigators.

You might consider ensuring the expert you retain to investigate a traffic accident belongs to both groups, or your “generalist” forensic engineer retains one who does. (Ref. 1) Same as you would expect your engineering, medical, accounting, architectural, etc. expert to be registered with a recognized association.

CATAIR, the Canadian Association of Technical Accident Investigators and Reconstructionists is a support group of traffic accident investigators.  It was formed to provide a professional and affordable way of meeting and sharing experiences and ideas.

CATAIR was incorporated in B.C. in 1984 and nationally in 1991.  Ken Zwicker, Nova Scotia, current chairman for the Atlantic region, has served on the national executive since the group’s inception.  Membership consists of police officers, former officers, and consultants of various stripes from across Canada, the U.S. and overseas.

I learned about this group when I conferred with a RCMP officer in connection with a slip and fall accident that I was investigating.  He is a member of CATAIR.  Members use some techniques similar to those I do when investigating accidents.

I have a general interest in how different groups investigate technical issues in their work, and how these techniques might be adapted to forensic engineering investigation – science in general, crime, medicine, etc., and now traffic accidents.

The Atlantic region meets quarterly and I started attending as a guest.  The next meeting is this Friday in Dartmouth.  There’s often a technical session and field day during the meeting.  The association investigates test procedures and calibrates testing equipment during these sessions.  Seeing this during my visits revealed the science-based nature of the group.  Just what you want in your experts and their associations.

The meeting on Friday will:

• See a demonstration of the latest school bus safety features,
• Perform instrumented braking and acceleration tests,
• Measure the bus’s turning radius and rear wheel off-tracking, and,
• Examine sight lines/views obstructions.

The national annual general meeting was held in Dartmouth last fall.  I attended a meet-and-greet and chatted with members from across Canada and the U.S.  These are well experienced traffic accident investigators, and some have gone on to train people on how to prevent accidents.  Examinations were held during the AGM for investigators who wanted to be accredited as meeting a minimum standard.

ACTAR, the Accreditation Commission for Traffic Accident Reconstruction, an international group formed in 1991, promotes recognition of minimum standards for traffic accident reconstruction.  To that end the commission developed a multi-part accreditation examination.  It’s one of the most comprehensive examinations I’ve seen outside of a university engineering program.

Applicants must meet certain standards of education and experience.  They are then required to complete separate theoretical and practical examinations covering more than 10 topics for each.  The topics focus on the math, physics and field testing and evaluation in traffic accident investigation.  The examinations are taken in different levels and you progress through these to become accredited.

ACTAR’s examinations are so comprehensive that a mini industry has developed to prepare applicants to take the exams covering topics like the following:

• The nature of the examination
• Exam preparation
• Practice examinations
• Test examination

Accredited investigators have successfully completed the examination and are properly trained and experienced in accident reconstruction.  Status in ACTAR is maintained after completing the initial examination by obtaining a minimum number of continuing education units over a five year period.  The continuing education we must all embrace in our professions.

This is not to say that traffic accident investigators who have not done the examination are not qualified.  I know of at least two that certainly are qualified.  What it does do is demonstrate to the public and the justice system that your expert’s qualifications have been “peer reviewed”.  This might be important in some cases.

You can visit these groups at www.catair.net and www.actar.org

Reference

1. The “generalist” forensic engineer.  Posted February 5, 2016